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CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

THE RIGHT OF AN ABUSED CHILD TO INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL AND THE ROLE OF THE CHILD
ADVOCATE IN CHILD ABUSE CASES
JAMES
I.

R.

REDEKERt

INTRODUCTION

AT LEAST SINCE THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION in In
re Gault,' the providing of independent counsel to juveniles who are
parties to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings affecting their liberty
has been a subject of great concern and interest to the bar, courts,
legislatures and service-delivery systems. Only relatively recently,
however, has the focus turned to the right to counsel of juveniles who
are subjects of essentially civil processes affecting their custody or
2
quality of life.

This article treats the issues of whether a child who is the
subject of a report of suspected abuse under the Child Protective
Services Law of Pennsylvania 3 is entitled to independent counsel
and, if so, the point in the process that this entitlement attaches, the

$ Co-chairperson, Committee on Child Abuse of the Young Lawyers Section of
the Philadelphia Bar Association. B.A., Central University of Iowa, 1963; M.A.,
University of Arkansas, 1964; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1968. Member of the
Pennsylvania Bar. Mr. Redeker expresses his appreciation to Joseph Donley, Esquire,
Manya Kamerling, Esquire, Bruce L. Thall, Esquire, Faye Cohen, Esquire and Andrea
Broad for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. These civil procedures include, for example, hearings to determine custody
and involuntary civil commitment hearings to determine mental competency. See
notes 7-32 and accompanying text infra.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Cum.Supp. 1977-1978). The Child
Protective Services Law was enacted several years ago, Act of Nov. 26, 1975, P.L. 438,
to encourage more complete reporting of child abuse and to establish in each
county a child protective service capable of investigating such reports swiftly
and competently, providing protection for children from further abuse and
providing rehabilitative services for children and parents involved so as to
ensure the child's well-being and to preserve and stabilize family life wherever
appropriate.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2202 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). This law defines an
"abused child" as a
child under 18 years of age who exhibits evidence of serious physical or mental
injury not explained by the available medical history as being accidental, sexual
abuse, or serious physical neglect, if the injury, abuse or neglect has been caused
by the acts or omissions of the child's parents or by a person responsible for the
child's welfare . ...
Id. § 2203. The Child Protective Services Law is administered on the state level by the
Department of Public Welfare, which keeps records of all child abuse complaints. Id.
§ 2214. On the county level, the public child welfare agencies establish within
themselves "child protective services" to carry out the responsibility of receiving and
investigating reports of suspected child abuse. Id. § 2216(a). The child protective
services are authorized to purchase the services of any appropriate public or private
agency. Id. § 2216(b). See also notes 9 & 21 infra.
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adequacy of the statutory guardian ad litem system as a means of
providing counsel and, finally, the role of the counsel representing
the abused child.
II.

THE RIGHT OF AN ABUSED CHILD TO COUNSEL

The issues of whether a child who is the subject of a report of
suspected abuse must be provided independent counsel and, if so, at
what point in the procedure must counsel be provided have not been
squarely met to date by any court in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless,
various recent Pennsylvania court decisions in related areas, 4 the
unmistakable trend of federal and state court decisions in other
jurisdictions, 5 and the apparent intent of the Pennsylvania legislature in the construction of the Child Protective Services Law 6 leave
little doubt that an abused child in Pennsylvania has a right to be
represented by independent counsel. The time when that right
attaches, however, remains unclear.
A.

The Existence of the Right

A number of Pennsylvania cases have firmly established that a
juvenile who. is the subject of custody proceedings in the commonwealth is entitled to representation by counsel at the custody
hearing.7 In Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service,8 an
action was brought under the Juvenile Act 9 by foster parents for a
determination as to the custody of a child whom the county Child
Care Service sought to return to the natural parents. 10 Section 20 of
the Juvenile Act" provides that counsel must be provided to a
juvenile at all stages of any proceeding under that statute; this right
4. See text accompanying notes 7-21 infra.
5. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th
Cir. 1968); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Wis. 1972); Landeros v. Flood, 17
Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976); notes 24-32 and accompanying text
infra.
6. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2202, 2223 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); note 3
supra.
7. See text accompanying notes 8-21 infra.
8. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§50-101 to -337 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). The
Juvenile Act is concerned, inter alia, with the custody and treatment of delinquent
juveniles. See id. § 50-101(2). The act also addresses the welfare of the "deprived child"
(see note 21 infra). Id. § 50-102(4). As with the Child Protective Services Law (see note
3 supra) family stability is an important goal of this legislation. The primary purpose
of the Juvenile Act is "[t]o preserve the unity of the family whenever possible and to
provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of
children [covered by the act]." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-101(1) (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978). See note 21 infra.
10. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. at 374, 324 A.2d at 564-65.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §50-317 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
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can be waived by an affirmative act of a parent, guardian or
custodian only when their interests are not in conflict with the
interests of the child. 12 In a well-reasoned opinion, the Stapleton
court noted that the juvenile's right to counsel was not affected or
limited by the fact that he may be the subject of, as opposed to a
party to, the proceeding. Judge Edmund B. Spaeth, writing for the
court, stated:
To say that the child is merely the subject of a proceeding,
not a "party" to it, would be to return to the child-as-chattel
mentality. .

.

. [The child] is just as much a party to this case,

which will determine his future, as he would be if . . . the
proceeding were a delinquency proceeding.
Now can anyone waive [his] right to counsel. The purpose of
the hearing will be to determine what is in his best interests. To
confer power to waive counsel, whether on the [parents], the
[foster parents], or the Child-Care Service, would be to prejudge
the case, since it would amount to a determination that the
party's interests were in accord with [the child's] best interests.13
The outstanding significance of the Stapleton case on the issue
of the right to counsel of an allegedly abused child is the recognition
by the court of the child as an independent human being with the
right to articulate his own interests in matters affecting his custody
and the quality of his life. According to Judge Spaeth:
The basic error in the argument made in behalf of the claim of
the Society for the custody of the child because of the Society's
"rights" under the [placement] contract .

.

. is that the child is

treated as a chattel without any rights in respect to his own
happiness and physical well being. That a child cannot be made
the subject of a contract with the same force and effect as if it
14
were a mere chattel has long been established law.
12. Section 20 provides:
Except as otherwise provided under this act a party is entitled to
representation by legal counsel at all stages of any proceeding under this act and
if he is without financial resources or otherwise unable to employ counsel, to
have the court provide counsel for him. If a party appears without counsel the
court shall ascertain whether he knows of his right thereto and to be provided
with counsel by the court if applicable. The court may continue the proceeding to
enable a party to obtain counsel. Counsel must be provided for a child unless his
parent, guardian, or custodian is present in the court and affirmatively waive it.
However, the parent, guardian, or custodian may not waive counsel for a child
when their interest may be in conflict with the interest or interests of the child. If
the interests of two or more parties may conflict, separate counsel shall be
provided for each of them.
Id. § 50-317.
13. 228 Pa. Super. Ct. at 392-93, 324 A.2d at 573 (footnotes omitted).
14. Id. at 381-82, 324 A.2d at 568, quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Children's Aid
Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92, 66 A.2d 300, 304 (1949) (footnote omitted).
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The holding of Stapleton was followed in two subsequent
Juvenile Act custody cases. In the case of In re Clouse,15 the court,
citing Stapleton, stated: "In a child custody case, the hearing judge
receives evidence from all interested parties, and the child should be
represented by counsel, for the child's interests may be distinct from
16
any other party's."
Similarly, in In re LaRue17 the court again cited Stapleton,
stating that in such proceedings "evidence should be received from
all interested parties, and the child should be represented by counsel,
for its interests may be distinct from any other party's."' 18 The
LaRue court, while dealing specifically with section 20 of the
Juvenile Act,' 9 spoke in more general constitutional terms, clearly
recognizing that, not only may the interests of a parent and child
conflict, but also that the state's interest in preserving the integral
family unit and the child's interest in the quality and conditions of
his life can be at odds:
Parents may not dispose of their children at will. The right to
have and raise children is coupled with a "high duty.". . . Too
often this duty is ignored. Instead of a shelter where love and
security may be found, the family becomes a Hell. No one who
has seen what parents sometimes do to children will think this
language too strong. 20
The custody cases reviewed above reinforce the right to counsel
for juveniles who are "subjects" of proceedings under the Juvenile
Act. 21 However, the Child Protective Services Law which covers
15. 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 396, 368 A.2d 780 (i976).
16. Id. at 399, 368 A.2d at 781, citing Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care
Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
17. 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 366 A.2d 1271 (1976).
18. Id. at 228-29, 366 A.2d at 1276, citing Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child
Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974). See THE BATTERED CHILD (R.
Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited as THE BATTERED
FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING (1973); PRACTICING LAW
EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE,

Problems 1970);

THE

RIGHTS OF

CHILDREN:

CHILD]; V.
INSTITUTE,

ch. 5 (Criminal Law and Urban

EMERGENT

CONCEPTS

OF LAW AND

(Wilkerson ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN].
19. For the text of § 20, see note 12 supra.
20. 244 Pa. Super. Ct. at 225, 366 A.2d at 1274, quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (citations omitted).
21. See notes 9-20 and accompanying text supra. The Juvenile Act also contains
a procedure for "deprived" children. The definition of "deprived child" is contained in
§ 2(4):
"Deprived child" means a child who: (i) is without proper parental care of
control, subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals; or (ii) has
been placed for care or adoption in violation of law; or (iii) has been abandoned
by his parents, guardian, or other custodian; or (iv) is without a parent,
SOCIETY

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/5

4

Redeker: The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role

1977-1978]

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

abuse cases contains no provision parallel to section 20 of the

Juvenile Act. 22 Nevertheless, an abused child's right to counsel can
be inferred from federal cases in analogous noncriminal areas that
have imposed a right to counsel whenever a custodial change or a
23
deprivation of liberty Was threatened.

In Bartley v. Kremens, 24 a federal class action was brought on
behalf of children under the age of nineteen who had been or could
be committed to mental health facilities pursuant to Pennsylvania's

guardian, or legal custodian; or (v) while subject to compulsory school
attendance is habitually and without justification truant from school.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(4) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
Once a child has been found to be "deprived," the court has wide powers to
make remedial orders. Section 24 of the act states:
Disposition of deprived child:
(a) If the child is found to be a deprived child the court may make any of
the following orders of disposition best suited to the protection and physical,
mental, and moral welfare of the child:
(1) Permit the child to remain with his parents, guardian, or other
custodian, subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes, including
supervision as directed by the court for the protection of the child.
(2) Subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes transfer
temporary legal custody to any of the following: (i) any individual in or outside of
Pennsylvania who, after study by the probation officer or other person or agency
designated by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive and care
for the child; (ii) an agency or other private organization licensed or otherwise
authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child or (iii) a public agency
authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.
(3) Without making any of the foregoing orders, transfer custody of the
child to the juvenile court or another state if authorized by and in accordance
with Section 32.
(b) Unless a child found to be deprived is found also to be delinquent, he
shall not be committed to or confined in an institution or other facility designed
or operated for the benefit of delinquent children.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §50-321 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
Since the evidence in many cases may be insufficient to prove abuse but
sufficient to establish deprivation, sound practice in Pennsylvania is to bring a
petition under both the Juvenile Act and Child Protective Services Law. Doing so also
provides the benefit of the right to counsel requirement of the Juvenile Act. See id.
§50-317; note 3 supra.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). See note 3
supra. The most analogous provision of the Child Protective Services Law to § 20 of
the Juvenile Act (see note 12 supra)is the former law's guardian ad litem provision,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2223 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). See note 92 infra. For
reasons developed later in this article, it is the opinion of this author that providing
the abused child with a guardian ad litem does not satisfy that child's constitutional
right to counsel. See notes 112-31 and accompanying text infra.
23. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36
(1967); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
24. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded because the laws found unconstitutional
had been repealed, so that the action was moot, and because the Court felt that the
passage of time and change of law rendered the continued validity of the plaintiffs'
"class" dubious. 431 U.S. at 133. See text accompanying note 25 infra. This
subsequent disposition did not in any way detract from the finding of the right to
counsel.
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statutes. 25 Among the challenges was the assertion that a probable
cause hearing must be held within seventy-two hours from the date
of the initial detention and that counsel must be provided at that
time. 26 In responding to the argument advanced by the commonwealth that assistance of counsel would transform institutionalization proceedings into adversarial proceedings - thereby delaying
the treatment of the subject and increasing the danger of trauma 27 the court stated:
Notice and the opportunity to be heard may be of little value
without the assistance of counsel.. . . A child whose liberty is in

question "needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a
defense and to prepare and submit it." . . . As the right to

counsel applies to criminal cases, so it must apply during all
significant stages of the commitment process, and plaintiffs
must be informed of both their right to counsel and . . . to
28

appointment of free counsel.

In another class action contesting the validity of civil commitment procedures which did not provide for adversary counsel, a
three-judge federal district court panel in Wisconsin clearly found, in
Lessard v. Schmidt,29 that representation by a true advocate is a
fundamental right of any person subject to a restriction of liberty
and that a person detained on grounds of mental illness had a right
to counsel, and to appointed counsel if necessary. 30 In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied heavily on Heryford v. Parker,31 in which
the chief judge of the Tenth Circuit compared the situation of a
mentally deficient individual to that of a juvenile in a delinquency
procedure and stated:
[L]ike Gault, and of utmost importance, we have a situation in
which the liberty of an individual is at stake, and we think the

25.
26.
27.
28.

402 F.
402 F.
Id. at
402 F.

Supp. at 1041, citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402-4403 (Purdon 1969).
Supp. at 1039, 1042 & n.5.
1050.
Supp. at 1050-51, quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (citations

omitted).
29. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Wis. 1974), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp.
1318 (D. Wis. 1976).
30. 349 F. Supp. at 1097. The Lessard court also held that the guardian ad litem
provision in the Wisconsin statute at issue did not satisfy this right to counsel. 349 F.
Supp. at 1099. For a further discussion of the adequacy of the guardian ad litem as
counsel, see notes 112-31 and accompanying text infra.
31. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). See 349 F. Supp. at 1097.
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reasoning in Gault emphatically applies. It matters not whether
the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal" or whether the
subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is
the likelihood of involuntary incarceration - whether for
punishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a juvenile
for delinquency, or treatment and training as a feeble-minded or
mental incompetent - which commands observance of the
constitutional safeguards of due process. Where, as in both
proceedings for juveniles and mentally deficient persons, the
state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable
duty to . . .see that a subject of an involuntary commitment
proceeding is afforded the opportunity to . . . legal counsel at
every step of the proceedings ....32
The framers of the Model Child Abuse and Reporting Law 33 also
recognized the right of an abused child to counsel and specifically
provided as follows:
Children subject to any judicial proceeding regarding child
abuse or neglect shall be entitled to legal counsel appointed by
the Court at public expense. Counsel for the child shall in no
case be the same as counsel for the alleged abuser or any
34
governmental or social agency involved.
Whether it is recognized that a child who is the subject of an
35
abuse proceeding is entitled to the benefits of independent counsel,
such a need is clear. In any action to declare a child deprived or
abused, a conflict necessarily ensues between the rights of the child
and the parent or custodian. This conflict most often is resolved only
through judicial proceedings. 36 Under these circumstances, "[t]he
'37
State becomes both arbiter and party.
In child abuse or deprivation proceedings, the state and the
parents frequently are each represented by counsel.3 8 Under the
32. 396 F.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
33.

MODEL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING LAw § 15A (1975), reprinted
SUSSMAN & S. COHEN, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 54 (1975).
[hereinafter cited as SUSSMAN & COHEN].

in A.

34. Id.
35. See SUSSMAN & COHEN, supra note 33, at 53-55 (1975). See generally Coyne,
Who Will Speak for the Child? in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 18, at 193-211;
Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The
Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 16 (1976); MacDonald, A Case for Independent
Counsel to Represent Children in Custody Proceedings, 7 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 351
(1972).
36. See Coyne, supra note 25, at 193-211; Comment, Recognition and Protection
of the Family's Interests in Child Abuse Proceedings, 13 J. FAM. L. 803, 806 (1973-74).
37. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct. at 387, 324
A.2d at 570.
38. See Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra
note 18, at 178, 200.
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doctrine of parens patriae, the state, historically, was charged with
protecting the interest of the child. 39 Yet, in abuse cases, as in other
juvenile proceedings, the state is also an interested party. As one
writer states:
In theory, the State should represent the best interests of the
child. It is possible, however, that the State may lose sight of the
fact that the child's interests may be best served by rehabilitating the parents in keeping the family intact.
The parties to the proceeding, however, are in opposition: the social workers seek removal of the child; the parents are
fighting to retain custody, the helpless child is caught in the
middle. Thus, there appears to be a need that some consideration
40
be given to the adversary nature of any such proceeding.
Certainly, the attorney who represents the parents in a child
abuse proceeding has, as his primary obligation to his clients, the
duty to seek a finding most satisfactory to the parents and this
translates itself most often into a position that "no abuse" has
occurred. 41 The stigma attached to a parent as a "child abuser" is
one which the advocate must seek to prevent in his client's best
interests - despite the consequences to the child. 42 The seriousness
of being labeled a child abuser was recognized by Judge Spaeth in
his separate opinion in the case of In re Sharpe:43
It is therefore apparent that by its finding that James is an
abused child the lower court has done appellant great damage.
Many would characterize a child abuser as one of the most
despicable and unworthy persons in the community, others, as
one of the most pitiful. It is reasonable to suppose that the
reputation of anyone labeled by a court as a child abuser has
been destroyed. Not only has appellant been so labeled, but she
will be so labeled for 15 more years. In addition to destroying
appellant's reputation, the label of child abuser may have a
decisive effect in subsequent legal proceedings relating to her
39. See Comment, A Recommendationfor CourtAppointed Counsel in Child Abuse
Proceedings, 46 Miss. L. J. 1072, 1075-77 (1975). The doctrine of parens patriae refers
to the "sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability ... such as
minors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
40. Comment, supra note 36, at 812-13 (1973-74). See, e.g., In re DeSavage, 241
Pa. Super. Ct. 174, 360 A.2d 237 (1976); cf. Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Serv.,
228 Pa. Super. Ct. 371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
41. See generally Paulsen, supra note 38, at 178.
42. See generally id.
43.

-

Pa. Super. Ct.

-,

374 A.2d 1323 (1977).
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child, not to mention the effect it may have on the relationship
between her and her child when he is old enough to understand
44
what a child abuser is.

Given the nature of a child abuse proceeding, it is obvious,
therefore, that the parents' position is adverse to that of the child,
despite what natural love and affection the parent may possess for
the child.
Although not as obvious, the state's position, as represented by
the Department of Public Welfare and the county child protective
services - the administrative unit in the Child Protective Services
Law 45 - often collides with the child's individual interest. The
representatives of the state are charged with the responsibility of
advocating the state's interest, which is, at best, what the state
deems will ensure the child's well-being 46 in light of the stated
legislative mandate in the Pennsylvania Child Protective Services
47
Law "to preserve and stabilize family life wherever appropriate."
Consequently, in all close cases, the county child protective service
invariably advocates the return to, or the maintaining of a child in
his own home. This is despite the fact that the home, in the vast
majority of child abuse cases nationwide, has been the source of the
abuse. 48 The child protective services thus often cannot seek a result
that is in the best interests of the child while also serving the state's
interest in preserving and stabilizing families.
Just as counsel for the parents must pursue the independent
interests of his client,4 9 so too, the attorney representing the state is
bound to serve his client's interest.5° In addition, the state's interests
or problems may have an impact upon the recommendations made
51
by a child protective service to the detriment of the child.
Insufficient funding may result in inadequate psychiatric, diagnostic and treatment programming, lack of sufficient staff to prepare
cases properly and fewer contracts with service agencies. These
factors may be far more responsible for the recommendations made
in a particular case than the special needs of the child. 52 Because of
44. Id. at -,
374 A.2d at 1329 (Spaeth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
45. See note 3 supra.
46. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2202 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).

47. Id.
48. See Gil, Incidence of Child Abuse and Demographic Characteristics of
Persons Involved in THE BATrERED CHILD, supra note 18, at 33 & Table 16.
49. See notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text supra.
50. See Skoler, Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings- A Total CriminalJustice
Perspective, 8 J. FAM. L. 243, 271 (1968).
51. Id.
52. See Fraser, supra note 35, at 32.
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these potential conflicts with both parents and the state, independent counsel is needed to represent the child if he is to be guaranteed
53
an advocate for his interests and his interests alone.
In part, the recognition that juvenile subjects of judicial or quasijudicial proceedings affecting their custody and the quality of their
lives are entitled to independent counsel is a product of the more
general recognition that the child is an individual; 54 not merely a
product of a marriage or a chattel, subject to the unrestricted will of
the parents, or the unsolicited protection of the state.5 5 Once it is
recognized that a child is not the property of either the parents or the
state but is an individual with personal rights, the question really
becomes who is going to speak for the child in a proceeding which
56
will affect or determine his future life?
The evolutionary process beginning with In re Gault5

and

continuing through the federal cases discussed58 has developed the
clear principle that any juvenile who is the subject of any proceeding
which may affect his custody or quality of life is constitutionally
entitled to independent counsel, regardless of the particular nature of
the proceeding. 59 Applying this mandate to children in Pennsylvania who are subjects of reports of suspected abuse pursuant to the
Child Protective Services Law raises extremely difficult questions,
not the least of which is when that right should attach.
B.

When The Right Accrues

Lessard6

Both the
and Heryford6 ' courts emphasized the
importance of the assistance of counsel from the inception of

53. See Comment, Courts: Seen and Not Heard: The Child's Need for His Own
Lawyer in Child-Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 442 (1976);
Comment, supra note 39.
54. See V. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 227-50 (1973); McGrath,
Early Sorrow: Some Children of Our Times in THE YOUNGEST MINORITY II, 195,
201-02 (Katz ed. 1977); United Nations Declarationof the Rights of the Child, G.A.
RES. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 19, reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN,
supra note 18.
55. See Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of
Wyman v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259 (1971).
56. See Coyne, supra note 35 at 193, 208-10.
57. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
58. See notes 24-32 and accompanying text supra.
59. Id. See authorities cited note 35 supra.
60. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Wis. 1972). For a discussion of Lessard, see text
accompanying notes 29 & 30 supra.
61. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). For a discussion of Heryford, see text
accompanying notes 31 & 32 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/5

10

Redeker: The Right of an Abused Child to Independent Counsel and the Role

1977-1978]

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

proceedings brought against the individual in which a deprivation of
liberty is possible. 62 The question arose in Lessard because the
subject of the proceedings had retained counsel prior to the
commencement of judicial hearings on the commitment, but after
interviews with psychiatrists upon whose evaluations decisions
affecting Lessard would be based. 63 In dealing with the time at
which the right adheres, the court stated:
We agree that the importance of the interests involved make
imperative the assistance of counsel as soon after proceedings
are begun as is realistically feasible. Certainly the detained
individual must have counsel at the preliminary hearing on
detention, with time enough before that hearing to prepare any
initial defenses which may be available. Otherwise the right to
representation by counsel may be a formality [and a] grudging
64
gesture to a ritualistic requirement.
The Lessard court also found that such counsel must necessarily
have access to any and all reports, psychiatric or otherwise, which
65
would be introduced at the hearing on commitment.
6
6
In the case of In re Barnard, the appellant challenged an order
of the District of Columbia federal district court that mandated his
confinement as an emergency involuntary patient.6 7 Pursuant to a
hearing requested and granted under the applicable statute, 68 the
court below had found that the certificate of the admitting
psychiatrist and the application for emergency hospitalization
formed an adequate basis for detaining the appellant who had been
represented by counsel at that proceeding.6 9 In dealing with the
challenge, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution provides "that every
person shall be free from seizure unless supported by probable
cause."70 The court interpreted this to mean that one need not be
arrested in order to have the fourth amendment protections
62. The Lessard court noted that the inception of proceedings in mental health
commitments may be by complaint. 349 F. Supp. at 1099-1100 & n.29. The Heryford
court stated that effective assistance of counsel must be provided at all significant
stages including judicial proceedings and any other official proceedings affecting
liberty. 386 F.2d at 389 & n.5.
63. 349 F. Supp. at 1081.
64. 349 F. Supp. at 1099, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
65. 349 F. Supp. at 1099-1100.
66. 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
67. Id. at 1372.
68. Id. at 1372-73, citing D.C. CODE § 21-525 (1967).
69. 455 F.2d at 1373.
70. Id.
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applied.7" Indeed, the court noted that the purpose of the fourth
amendment "was and is to guarantee that no person will be deprived
72
of his freedom without due process of law."

In the course of its decision, the court observed that the District
of Columbia Code 73 provided for representation of counsel in such
proceedings.7 4 The court additionally found that there was a
constitutional right to counsel, not premised in any way on the
statute, stating:
We think there is a constitutional right to counsel at this
hearing. The judge in his . . . order should appoint the Public

Defender Service to represent the patient, at least until retained
counsel notes his appearance, and a copy of the order should be
served on the patient as well as the Service. By this procedure a
hearing can be quickly requested and concluded in an appropriate case and thus many
persons may be spared unnecessary
7 5
days in the hospital.

Thus, Barnard,like Lessard and Heryford, requires that counsel
be appointed at the earliest feasible stage of the proceeding in which
a deprivation of liberty is possible. The Barnardcourt grounded this
conclusion squarely on the Constitution, i.e., the fourth amendment's
76
protections against unreasonable seizures.
Similarly, in Dixon v. Attorney General of Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,77 a federal district court in Pennsylvania entered an
order requiring that counsel must be appointed at the initiation of
involuntary civil commitment proceedings involving the plaintiff
class stating: "The subject thereof shall be informed of his right to
counsel and an attorney shall be appointed to represent him unless
he can afford to retain an attorney himself.

' 78

Finally, in Lynch v. Baxley,79 where a class action was brought
in a federal district court in Alabama on behalf of persons who were
or might be involuntarily committed in a civil proceeding, the

71. Id. at 1373-74.
72. Id.
73. See note 68 supra.
74. 455 F.2d at 1375.
75. Id. at 1375-76.
76. Id. at 1373.
77. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
78. Id. at 974. In Dixon, the plaintiff class consisted of all the inhabitants of
Farview State Hospital - a maximum security institution which cares primarily for
the criminally insane - committed to and confined to Farview pursuant to § 404 of
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Retardation Act of 1966. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 4404 (1969) (repealed in part).
79. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
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statutes authorizing such commitment were challenged as unconstitutional on their face.10 In dealing with the question of the right to
counsel, Chief Judge Frank W. Johnson, speaking for the court
stated:
At the very least . . due process does require that the hearing
be preceded by adequate notice informing the person (or his
counsel) of the factual grounds upon which the proposed
commitment is predicated and the reasons for the necessity of
confinement; that the person be represented by counsel,
appointed if necessary .... 81
In explicating its decision, the Lynch court further noted that:
The subject of an involuntary civil commitment proceeding has
the right to the effective assistance of counsel at all significant
stages of the commitment process.. . . Further, he has the right
to be advised of his right to counsel,. . and to the appointment
of counsel if indigent. . . . Counsel must be made available far
enough in advance of the final commitment hearing to ensure
adequate opportunity for preparation ....
The right to counsel is a right to representative counsel
occupying a traditional adversarial role. Where state law
requires or permits the appointment of a guardian ad litem, such
appointment shall be deemed to satisfy the constitutional right
to counsel if, but only if, the .appointed guardian is a licensed
82
attorney and occupies a truly adversary position.
The "significant stages" of the process were defined by the court
to mean "all judicial proceedings and any other official proceedings
at which a decision is, or can be, made which may result in a
detrimental change in the conditions of the subject's liberty."' 3 Thus,
Lynch confirms that the requirement of the appointment of counsel
as close to the inception of any proceedings as reasonably possible
should extend to any state action in which, as one court observed, "a
citizen can be deprived of liberty even when the state's purpose is
84
benign."
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, it is settled that the subject
- juvenile or adult - of a state proceeding which may affect his
80. Id. at 385.
81. Id. at 388.
82. Id. at 389 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 389 n.5.
84. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp.
752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
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custody or the quality of his life, is entitled by the federal
constitution to independent counsel.8

5

Awareness in Pennsylvania of

this constitutional right is manifested in section 20 of the Juvenile
Act which provides for representation by, and if necessary,
appointment of counsel8 6 and in the expansive interpretation this
87
law has been given in the courts.
The more complex and timely issue, however, is when the

subject's right to the effective assistance of counsel must be satisfied
in the course of a child abuse proceeding. When is "as soon as
possible after proceedings are begun as are realistically feasible[?]" 8
Or what are the earliest "significant stage[s] of the . . . process...
at which a decision is, or can be, made which may result in a
detrimental change in the conditions of the subject's liberty[?]"' 9
The stages of a child abuse proceeding under the Child
Protective Services Law are: 90 Stage 1) from the filing of the report of
suspected abuse to the completion of the investigation; 91 Stage 2)
85. For cases involving the rights of juveniles to equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, rehearing
denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968). Since proceedings in Pennsylvania under the Juvenile Act
and the Child Protective Services Law place at risk the family unit (see note 3 supra),
it reasonably follows that each diverse or potentially diverse interest within the
family is entitled to independent counsel if the fourteenth amendment right is to be
meaningful.
86. See note 12 supra.
87. See notes 8-20 and accompanying text supra. It should be emphasized that
none of the Juvenile Act cases discussed (see id.) involved the penal aspects of that
statute. See note 9 supra. The procedure for taking a child into protective custody
under the Child Protective Services Law is found in § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). This section incorporates the custody section of the
Juvenile Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-308 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). There is
a cogent argument that the Juvenile Act custody cases discussed (see notes 8-20
supra) in which the essential nature of the § 20 right to independent counsel was
articulated by the court, impose a similar independent counsel requirement in custody
cases under the Child Protective Services Law. It is submitted that the guardian ad
litem provision in the latter statute does not guarantee this right. See notes 112-31
infra.
88. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1099 (D. Wis. 1972).
89. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The subtle differences
in the Lessard and Lynch standards should not be overlooked. "Realistic feasibility"
and "significant stage" may not always coincide.
90. For the purposes of this discussion, emergency protective custody to prevent
further abuse under § 8 of the Act and the 72-hour hearing provisions are not being
considered. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2208(a), (c) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). In
such cases, counsel should be appointed immediately. The child's interest in
immediate care pending final disposition would require in emergency cases that the
right to counsel attach immediately and the counterbalance of administrative
feasibility should not outweigh the child's interest. See note 131 infra. Moreover, § 23
guardians ad litem are probably required in these emergencies. For the text of § 2223,
see note 92 infra. See PA. LEGISLATIVE J. H3005 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1975).
91. Section 14 of the Child Protective Services Law provides that each report of
suspected abuse be investigated by the child welfare agency and be determined within
sixty days of the report as "unfounded," "indicated" or "founded." If the agency has
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from the completion of the investigation and a finding that the
report is "indicated" or "unfounded" through the attempts at
voluntary adjustment to the filing of a petition with the court; and
Stage 3) all court proceedings.
Section 23 of the statute provides for the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, who must be an attorney, upon the initiation of a
proceeding arising out of a child abuse.9 2 This has generally been
accepted as meaning when a petition has been filed with the court
seeking an adjudication of abuse and remedial order, or "Stage 3."
Such a construction is warranted as consistent with the legislative
93
intent.
To delay the appointment of counsel until "Stage 3" is, however,
far too late to pass constitutional muster. It is neither the first
significant stage of the proceeding nor as soon as realistically
feasible.9 4 In Philadelphia, for instance, less than 15% of all reported
made no such determination within the time prescribed, the report is automatically
considered "unfounded" and all records expunged. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214(k)
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). See note 95 infra.
Section 3 of the Child Protective Services Law defines an "unfounded" report
as any report which is neither "founded" nor "indicated." An "indicated report" is a
report of suspected abuse which, after investigation, appears to the child protective
service agency to be based on "substantial evidence" that "abuse exists." A "founded
report" is any report upon which there is any judicial adjudication based upon a
finding of abuse. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2223 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). The guardian ad
litem provision states:
(a) The court, when a proceeding has been initiated arising out of child abuse,
shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child. The guardian ad litem shall be
an attorney.at-law. The guardian ad litem shall be given access to all reports...
of examination of the child's parents or other custodian pursuant to this act. The
guardian ad litem shall be charged with the representation of the child's best
interests at every stage of the proceeding and shall make such further
investigation necessary to ascertain the facts, interview witnesses, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, make recommendations to the court and participate
further in the proceedings to the degree appropriate for adequately representing
the child.
(b) The court shall have the duty, upon consideration of the petition of any
attorney, for the child, to order a local child-protective service or other agency to
establish and/or implement, fully and promptly, appropriate services, treatment,
and plans for a child found in need of them. Additionally, the court, upon
consideration of the petition of any attorney for the child, shall have the duty to
terminate or alter the conditions of any placement, temporary or permanent, of a
child.
Id.
93. See PA. LEGISLATIVE J. H3005 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1975); PA. LEGISLATIVE J.
S926 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1975). The legislature apparently believed that § 23 of the
"Law" satisfied the child's right to counsel. It will be noted later that while the
legislature may have intended the guardian ad litem system to satisfy the right of an
allegedly abused child to counsel, it does not satisfactorily accomplish this purpose.
See note 131 infra.
94. As delineated below, the guardian ad litem system as a means of providing
counsel is, in and of itself, constitutionally suspect. See text accompanying notes
94-115 infra.
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cases of suspected abuse and neglect reach the court. 95 Over 85% of
all reported cases were either dismissed as "unfounded" or adjusted
voluntarily following an "indicated" determination. In each instance, the agency of the state made custodial decisions. From the
time the report is first filed, the agency has the ability to proceed to
obtain custody of the child. This may be done in some cases without
a hearing at which the parents would be present or in other cases
upon requests made to law enforcement officials. 96 From the time a
report is filed, therefore, a decision regarding the child's custody is
not only possible but is continually taking place because of the
state's ever present power of direct action. As a result, all stages of a

child abuse proceeding are "significant" in the sense used by the
court in Lynch. Ideally, therefore, the right of a subject child to the
effective assistance of counsel should accrue at the time a report of
suspected abuse is filed.

Unfortunately, it is not feasible to provide a court appointed
counsel to every subject child at Stage 1, especially in large

metropolitan areas in which the volume of reported cases exceeds the
ability of the system to supply effective counsel to all subject
children. 97 Moreover, while the risk of tragedy following an
inadequate investigation is great and the appointment of counsel
during Stage 1 may result in a lower percentage of error, the role of

the attorney during this stage would be limited principally to
scrutiny of the investigation.9 8 This use of an attorney to perform
this "watchdog" function does not seem to be either the proper or
95. In 1976, 1,738 reports of suspected abuse were received by the Philadelphia
Department of Public Welfare (DPW) - the county agency administering the
statutory duties (see note 3 supra). In 1976, approximately 5,000 reports of suspected
abuse and neglect cases were reported. Of that number, about 600 (12%) of these cases
were made the subject of court petitions. The Philadelphia DPW would not inform this
author of the number of cases reported in 1976 which were subsequently found to be
"unfounded" or "indicated." See note 91 supra.
The 1976 Child Abuse Report of the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare, however, states that 48 (2.8%) cases were determined to be "founded," that
771 (44.4%) were "indicated" and that 915 (52.6%) were "unfounded." The number of
cases listed as "unfounded" may be misleading since 587 cases were listed as
"unfounded" solely because the investigations on these cases were not filed by the
local DPW within 60 days. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §2214(k) (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978). This frightening trend appears to continue unabated. The unofficial state
totals for 1977 reveal that of the 4,537 reports of suspected abuse in Philadelphia,
1,550 were listed as "unfounded" merely because the Philadelphia DPW did not file
results of investigations concerning them within the mandated 60 days. See id.
96. Under § 17(7) of the Child Protective Services Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
2217(7) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). the child protective agency could obtain
immediate temporary custody of a child through the procedure of § 8 of the statute, id.
§ 2208, or by obtaining an emergency court order whenever necessary to protect the
child. Id. § 2217(7).
97. See note 131, infra.
98. See Fraser, supra note 35, at 34.
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necessary role of counsel.9 9 Theoretically, the state agency should be
capable of performing the investigative function adequately without
the interjection of an outsider into the process. 100 While a child has
the right to an independent counsel to insure that, to the extent
possible within the system, a determination is in his best interest or
to his least detriment as the least restrictive alternative,10 1 it is

doubtful that the appointment of counsel is constitutionally
mandated at a time when the state agency is initially charged with
determining probable cause to credit allegations of suspected

abuse. 102
The point in a child abuse proceeding by which counsel should
be guaranteed would appear to be when the state agency determines
that child abuse is "indicated."10 3 Such a determination virtually

assures that something will be done which will affect the custody of
the child and determine to some extent the future quality of his life.
Whether the action is taken as a result of the parents' voluntary
99. But see Fraser, supra note 35, at 34, 45, wherein the author argues that this
investigatory function is the cornerstone to the effectiveness of the guardian's role. Id.
100. See Fraser, supra note 35, at 34.
101. See generally THE BATTERED CHILD (2d ed. R. Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1974);
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE COMMUNITY AND FAMILY (R. Helfer & C. Kempe
eds. 1976); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973).
102. The courts in both Lessard and Lynch stated that, as a general rule, the
mandate of due process did not require counsel during the purely investigative stage.
349 F. Supp. at 1100; 386 F. Supp. at 389 n.5. However, the courts also agreed that the
rights of the subject would be violated if counsel were to be wholly excluded from the
effective means of evaluating the investigation at the time custodial decisions may be
made. 349 F. Supp. at 1099-1100; 386 F. Supp. at 389. Consequently, the investigative
agency must ensure access of counsel not only to the product of the investigation but
the manner in which it was conducted as well. The example used by the court in
Lessard and adopted by the court in Lynch was the taping of psychiatric interviews.
349 F. Supp. at 1100; 386 F. Supp. at 389 & n.5. One of the most questionable
provisions in the Child Protective Services Law which developed as a compromise
following substantial lobbying is that which provides for the expunging of the record
in the event a report is determined to be unfounded either by investigation or the
passage of 60 days. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214(k) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
The loss to the system of the ability to correct its errors seems potentially more tragic
than any damage which could occur from retaining the information. The risk of
tragedy is too great.
103. Fraser, supra note 35, at 34, also contends that counsel must be appointed
after the investigation has been completed by the social agency and a preliminary
diagnosis of the child's condition is made. Fraser too recognizes that such
investigations are often incomplete or improperly conducted. Consequently, Fraser
sets forth as the task of the child's counsel that of investigation, rechecking, and
supplementing the investigation of the agency. Fraser, supra note 37, at 35-39 &
nn.115-19. Our experience confirms the wisdom of this recommendation and the
danger of blind reliance upon the investigative reports of the public agency.
Unfortunately the institutionalization of counsel to represent children in abuse cases
often results in high case loads and forced dependency upon the agencies'
investigations as the sole source of facts. See note 131 infra. The inadequacies of the
system are legitimized under the guise of due process and become self-perpetuating to
the detriment of the child.
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commitment of the child to the state agency 10 4 or a court proceeding
and order, the effect is the same, i.e., the future life of the child is
altered by direct state action.
The experience in Philadelphia adds a special urgency to the
need for counsel as soon as possible after a report is listed as
"indicated" and before any voluntary commitment is accomplished.'0 5 A voluntary commitment of the child by the parents to the
welfare agency in Philadelphia rarely, if ever, includes a detailed
program for the care and treatment of the child. This program is left
wholly within the discretion of the agency which must first of all
seek to maintain the family unit. 10 6 Moreover, the program is subject
to the economic and political considerations of the agency as well as
the needs of the child. 10 7 Consequently, a child may be placed in a
group home or institution or returned home under supervision of the
agency because of contractual commitments of the agency with the
service delivery organizations - and not because the facility is best
suited for the child's well being.
It has been also our experience that critical psychiatric or
psychological treatment frequently is not provided in voluntary
commitment cases simply because the agency has not expended the
funds necessary to obtain minimally adequate diagnosis or has not
contracted with facilities that offer such services.' 0 8 Consequently,
the most that can be expected in these cases is often 6 nly that the
child will be boarded in a reasonably safe place. Since the intent of
the law goes far beyond the mere safety of the person and aims to
achieve that which is in the child's best interest, including custody,
diagnosis, and treatment, participation of the child's counsel in the
decisions of where and under what circumstances the child will live
and the treatment to be provided is essential to due process. This
would be true even when services are adequate simply because of the
inherent conflicts of interest. 01 9
The court in Dixon clearly recognized the importance to due
process of the establishing of a treatment plan prior to involuntary
104. The standard practice in Philadelphia is that all voluntary commitments are
confirmed by an ex parte court order which prohibits parents from regaining custody
of their children without leave of court. The propriety of this practice is dubious at
best.
105. For a discussion of the number and disposition of reports in Philadelphia in
1977, see note 95 supra.
106. See notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
107. See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
108. This conclusion is based upon the experience of the Committee on Child
Abuse of the Young Lawyers Section of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
109. See text accompanying notes 48-53 supra. An important issue beyond the
scope of this article is whether the child's custodian may be required by the court to
undergo diagnosis and/or treatment.
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commitment.10 ° There, a federal district court in Pennsylvania found
constitutionally infirm the prior state practice of blanket commitments to the state facility and required the participation of the
subject's attorney or guardian in the establishing of the program to
be effected during confinement."' So also in abuse cases, the
custodial and treatment program must be developed at a time when
the subject child has the effective assistance of counsel. Failure to
provide counsel in all cases at this stage must necessarily result in a
deprivation of due process.
III. THE GUARDIAN Ad Litem As

COUNSEL

The Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law provides for
the appointment of a guardian ad litem, who is an attorney, to
represent the best interests of the child when the proceeding of a
case of suspected abuse is initiated in the court." 2 This is not, it is
submitted, a satisfactory means for the providing of counsel since
the guardian ad litem is not charged with the representation of the
child, but, rather, with the representation of the child's "best
interests.""13 Consequently, the guardian may simply act as a mere
extension of the state in its capacity as guardian of the child under
the doctrine of parens patriae.'1 4 It is precisely this confusion of roles
in the Pennsylvania statute that makes the Pennsylvania system
constitutionally suspect. 1 'As noted previously, the need for independent counsel is
partially based on the inherent conflicts which may exist between
110. 325 F. Supp. at 972-74.
111. Id. See note 77 & 78 and accompanying text supra.
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2223 (Purdon Cum.Supp. 1977-1978). For the text of
§ 2223, see note 92 supra.
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2223(a) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978). For the text of
this section, see note 92 supra.
114. See note 39 supra; SUSSMAN & COHEN, supra note 35, at 54; Coyne, in THE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 35, at 195; Comment, supra note 53, at 442. See
generally Stansby, In re Gault: Children are People in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN,
supra note 18, at 289-90.
115. The Lessard court focused on this distinction in roles and found the
constitutional right to counsel not satisfied by the Wisconsin statute. 349 F. Supp. at
1103. Cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. §9:6-8.23 (West 1976); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 241 (McKinney
1975).
According to Douglas J. Besharov, Director of the National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 24 states
specifically require the appointment of a guardian ad litem who is an attorney.
Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse and
Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 514 (1978). Impetus was given to representation of the child
through the guardian ad litem mechanism by the federal Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974, which mandates the institution of various state policies and
procedures as a prerequisite to the receipt of federal funds. 42 U.S.C.
§5103(b)(2)(A)-(2)(J) (Supp. V 1975). One such requirement was the providing of a
guardian ad litem to represent children in such proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(G).
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the parents or custodians and the child and between the state
agency and the child.1 16 Each "party" to the proceeding may have
its own concept of what may be in the "best interest" of the child.
The parent's concept may well be more indicative of what they desire
in their own interest than of what is in the best interest of the
child 17 and the state agency may view the future of the child
through its own prism of caseloads, supervision, and budget 1 8 as
well as the statute's own mandate for family unit preservation.' 19 In
spite of the imposition of a third party, a guardian ad litem, who
may offer an opinion unclouded by some of these other concerns, the
wishes of the child still may not be advanced in court under the
Pennsylvania system. This problem is clearest in cases involving
articulate children. For example, although a seventeen-year-old
victim of parental rape may have very cogent reasons for wanting a
specific disposition, it is quite possible that in Pennsylvania those
desires may never be advanced in court if the guardian ad litem
believes another disposition is in the best interest of the child. This
child, therefore, is effectively denied the benefit of a legal representative performing his duty as an advocate for the child. 2°
It was precisely this disunity between the role of a guardian ad
litem who determines his own concept of the "best interest" of the
child and the role of an advocate which led the Wisconsin federal
district court in Lessard v. Schmidt1 2 1 to find that the appointment
of a guardian ad litem did not fulfill the constitutional requirement
of the right to counsel.122 The court, noting that the Wisconsin Civil
Commitment Statute 23 provided for a guardian ad litem at the
discretion of the court, concluded nonetheless, that since the
guardian would not view his role as that of adversary counsel, his
appointment did not take the place of such counsel. 24 The court
indicated that the appointment of a guardian might be sufficient if
his role were clearly defined and restructured. 1 25
116. See text accompanying notes 36-53 supra.
117. See Steele & Pollack, A PsychiatricStudy of Parents Who Abuse Infants and

Small Children in THE

BATTERED CHILD,

supra note 18, at 103-45.

118. This distorted perspective has been documented in other jurisdictions. See

N.Y.

STATE ASSEMBLY COMM. ON CHILD ABUSE,

Report, 5-9 (1972) [hereinafter cited

as N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP.].
119. See note 3 and text accompanying notes 47 & 48 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 132-43 infra.
121. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Wis. 1972). See notes 29-32 and accompanying text
supra.
122. 349 F. Supp. at 1099.
123. Id. at 1097, citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.02(4) (West 1957). The court also noted
that the law required the guardian to be an attorney. Id. at 1097, citing Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 256.48 (West 1971).
124. Id. at 1097.
125. Id.
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The Lessard court, in support of its conclusion, cited a study of
the Wisconsin civil commitment procedures, 126 which found:
In the present practice, it seems clear that in almost all cases
where a guardian is appointed he sees his role not as an
advocate for the prospective patient but as a traditional
guardian whose function is to evaluate for himself what is in the
best interest of his client-ward and then proceed almost
1 27
independent of the will of the client-ward to accomplish this.
In the official comments to section 15A of the Model Child Abuse
and Reporting Law, 128 the drafters recognized the inadequacy of
relying upon a guardian ad litem, a representative of a social
services agency, counsel for the parent, or even the judge to
represent and promote the legal rights of a child. 129 They stated:
The legal rights of a child may not be represented adequately by
a guardian ad litem, a representative of a social services agency,
counsel for the parent or even a judge. A guardian ad litem is
unsuitable for two reasons. First, he may not be an attorney;
consequently, he might be unaware of many procedures
available to protect the legal rights of a child. Second, his duty
to represent the "best interests" of the child may conflict with
the expressed interest or desires of the child. Similarly, a
member of a social services agency may not represent the rights
and interests of the child, since his perspective is that of what is
best for the entire family in a community setting. Counsel for the
parent is unable to defend the rights of the child at the same
time, since the interests of the parents and the child may
conflict. Finally, the judge should not be cast in the additional
role of representing the child since his task is to weigh the
evidence and balance the competing rights of all parties in order
to reach a just and proper disposition. 13°
The rationale of the Lessard court and the drafters of the Model
Law is persuasive and it is the belief of this author that the guardian
ad litem system, as constructed in the Pennsylvania Child Protective

126. Id. at 1099.
127. Id., quoting Dix, Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for
Reexamination, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 33 (1967).
128. MODEL CHILD ABUSE AND REPORTING LAw § 15A, reprinted in SUSSMAN &
COHEN, supra note 33, at 54. For the text of § 15A, see text accompanying note 36
supra.
129. See MODEL CHILD ABUSE AND REPORTING LAW, reprinted in SUSSMAN &
COHEN, supra note 33, at 54.
130. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Services Law, does not satisfy the constitutional requirement that
children subject to child abuse proceedings be provided with legal
counsel.131
131. Various methods for providing counsel have been suggested generally and are
in practice in Philadelphia and surrounding jurisdictions. Counsel are supplied to
abused children in Philadelphia principally through three delivery systems. In terms
of number of cases, the Child Advocacy Unit of the Defender Association of
Philadelphia is the primary source for counsel. The stated goal of the Unit coincides
with the statutory mandate of reuniting the child with his family and keeping the
child within the family structure. This same mandate controls the operations of the
child protective service agency. See note 3 supra. The Unit attempts to secure services
to the child and child's family within the home structure which will resolve the
problematic situation. The Unit provides counsel only to those children who are
subjects of court petitions (less than 20 percent of the reported cases) and handles all
juvenile cases of which abuse cases are only a part. The Unit currently employs three
social workers, two investigators and five attorneys. During the first year of its
operation (1976) the unit employed three attorneys and handled in excess of 2000
cases.
Other delivery systems are the Juvenile Law Center and the Child Abuse
Committee of the Young Lawyers Section of the Philadelphia Bar Association. The
latter organization maintains a list of about 100 trained private practitioners who
seek appointments as counsel to abused children in selected cases as referred by
hospitals, doctors, the Department of Public Welfare and the courts. The attorneys act
without compensation. In 1976 the committee volunteers became involved in
approximately 75 cases. With funds from the Governor's Public Health Trust Fund,
the Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Foundation, the committee has
established a Support Center for Child Advocates which employs two social workers
(one of whom is also an attorney) for the purpose of assisting volunteer attorneys in
the preparation of cases and training new volunteers.
Delaware County utilizes approximately 36 private practitioners who are
appointed on a rotating basis and receive a flat $40.00 fee for each case handled.
Appointments are made only upon the filing of an abuse petition with the court. In
1976, 95 such appointments were made. When an abuse petition is filed in Chester
County a single attorney is appointed to represent the child. That attorney received 20
guardian ad litem appointments in 1976. The attorney is paid $15.00 per hour to a
maximum on any case of $250.00. Montgomery County appoints only private
practitioners to abuse cases, but, as in all other counties surveyed, only after an abuse
petition has been filed with the court. Just 12 appointments were made in the last year
and the attorneys are compensated at cost level fee schedules. The public defender
office in Bucks County represents all abuse children who are subjects of court
petitions. In 1976, there were 129 such cases.
The report of the New York State Assembly noted that after a three-year
study, the committee found the law guardian to be ineffective in most instances. N.Y.
SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 118, at 147. The assemblymen noted a distinction
between the effectiveness of these lawyers in the urban and non-urban areas of the
state. Id. at 148. In urban areas, the law guardians were generally attorneys attached
to a legal aid society. Their effectiveness was undermined by their heavy caseloads
and the lawyers "institutional bent." Id. at 148-50. The report noted that the law
guardians from the legal aid society, who also often represented children in
delinquency actions, had a bias towards preventing the removal of a child from the
home - a bias which was wrongly carried over to the abuse proceedings. Id. at
148-49. Although the report found that the law guardians as a group had failed to
assume a role of active representation, they did find that in the non-urban areas of the
state, the attorneys more adequately fulfilled their role, conducting active pretrial
investigations and playing a forceful part in the proceeding. Id. at 149-50. Because of
their view as to the ineffectiveness of the law guardian, the committee recommended
that a full-time "Children's Attorney" be appointed in each county. Id. at 153.
One writer suggests that reliance on individual practitioners is not an
adequate means of providing the child with counsel. C. E. Campbell, The Neglected
Child: His and His Family's Treatment Under Massachusetts Law and Their Rights
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IV.

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ADVOCATE
IN CHILD ABUSE PROCEEDINGS

The attorney who is charged with the representation of the child
in a child abuse case is faced with a difficult, and perhaps
conflicting, dual obligation. As with every other client, the lawyer is
obliged to represent the child "zealously within the bounds of the
132
law."
Yet, in representing a child, the attorney is more than a legal

1 34
representative, 133 since he must also act as the child's protector,

which, in the terms of the legal shibboleth, means that he must
advance the "best interests" of the child. It is because of this
manifest dual obligation, that independent counsel is vital for the
child since
Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 631, 687 (1970). The author
recommends the development of a new type of institutional means since the
individual practitioners will not have the time nor the interest to develop the expertise
necessary to effectively represent a neglected child. Id. The article additionally
cautions that the job should not be given to the attorney of the state agency which
will assume the custody of the child upon a finding of abuse or neglect. In that case,
in addition to the burden of the lawyer's existing caseload, as an employee of the
agency, he, like social workers, may have biases which would inhibit him from giving
the child the best representation to which he is entitled. Id.
A third view is taken by the authors of an article in the Chicago Kent Law
Review. See Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child
Syndrome, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 45 (1972). In that article, the authors suggest that
adequate representation in a child abuse case would take from 10 - 20 hours of
preparation and that the high caseload of the public defender and the unavailability
of adequate resources would preclude proper representation. Id. at 68. The article
suggests the use of private attorneys as an alternative. Id. at 77-78.
It is the third view which is supported by this author and the Committee on
Child Abuse of the Young Lawyers Section of the Philadelphia Bar Association.
Based upon over five years of experience, the estimate of 10-20 hours of attorney time
to handle a child abuse case properly is conservative and many cases have required in
excess of 50 hours. In part, this is due to the failure of the Philadelphia Family Court
to schedule most cases for certain times and their continuing to operate on the daily
case list system. Nevertheless, the committee's volunteers are told that in accepting a
case they must be prepared to spend 15-30 hours of their time. It is hoped that the
Support Center for Child Advocates (see supra) will reduce this time requirement
substantially.
It is our experience with the amount of time necessary to handle the
representation of an abused child properly which causes us to question the adequacy
of the systems utilized in Philadelphia and vicinity. Assuming 40 productive case
related hours per attorney and two weeks vac.'tion each, the Child Advocacy Unit of
the Defender Association of Philadelphia could have averaged not more than 3.3
hours per case. Delaware County's system of $40.00 per case seems unlikely to
stimulate extensive effort. For similar reasons, the Chester County System is
inadequate. Montgomery County's experience is too limited to reveal anything more
than the general and tragic lack of reporting and investigation. The Bucks County
use of the Public Defender may or may not be adequate, depending upon the case load.

132. ABA

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

Canon 7.

133. Cf. Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Proceedings: A NonPolar Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401-15 (1973).
134. See New York's system of "law guardians," N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 241-249
(McKinney 1975).
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[a]n inquiry into the best interests of a child may produce
differences of opinion when it is directed to the parents and to
the court. And if the child himself is capable of assessing his
own position, he may have an alternative of his own to suggest.
Such an alternative would135merit the skill of an advocate who
would represent the child.
In this rather conflicting role of lawyer-protector, the attorney
representing the child must tread delicately. He must advance and
protect the child's rights so as not to permit the child to be treated as
a "chattel" or the property of the marriage. 136 Yet, he cannot become
13 7
an avenging angel, as amateur social worker, or a psychologist.
The lawyer for the child is, in fact, that child's spokesperson, and, to
the degree possible, the child must be permitted to express his wishes
or desires, and to have them presented to the court.
One of the most important duties of the lawyer representing the
child in an abuse proceeding is to present the court with all relevant
information, which will permit the court to make an informed
decision. This requires extensive investigation, and communication
138
with the child, if possible.
The lawyer representing the child should look into all the
available alternatives and assess them in light of the interests of the
child, utilizing various expert opinions as to the child's needs. It
would be the responsibility of the child's attorney to investigate
thoroughly by consultation with "experts" in related social and
medical disciplines, in order to determine what the actual needs of
the child are. He may not substitute his opinion for those of the
expert, but must balance the assessed needs with the expressed
"wants" of his client.
Unlike with most clients, the lawyer may not be able to rely on
the child's expressions or desires. 139 The Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly imposes additional obligations and responsibilities upon the lawyer representing an incompetent or immature
client. Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A) provides: "A lawyer shall not

135. Coyne, supra note 35, at 201.
136. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Serv., 228 Pa. Super. Ct.
371, 324 A.2d 562 (1974).
137. See Seith-Lucas, Speaking for the Child in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra
note 18, at 218-31.
138. Cf. Kay & Segal, supra note 133.
139. See H. Janssen & L. Fishman, The Role of the Child's Attorney in How to
Handle a Child Abuse Case (unpublished paper of the Committee on Child Abuse of
the Young Lawyers Section of the Philadelphia Bar Association).
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intentionally (i) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client

'140
through reasonably available means.
In Commonwealth v. Silo, 1 4 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,

in a per curiam decision, found that: "The question of competency is
an issue that cannot be effectively waived. If there is any basis in
the record that would support such a claim, counsel is duty bound to
present that issue to the Court."' 142
Although perhaps not as obvious or compelling as in a criminal
proceeding, counsel representing a child would have a similar duty
to apprise the court of the degree of incapacity which his client
suffers. 43 In representing a child in an abuse proceeding, the
attorney should ascertain the extent to which the child can
articulate his needs and desires and the level of maturity which his
client possesses. In this respect, it may be necessary for counsel to
obtain expert opinions in those areas. Thus, the attorney representing the child must be careful to maintain a balance between his roles
as an advocate and protector. He must not be so zealous in his role
as advocate that in advancing his client's "desires" he may impair
his client's future; nevertheless, he must not permit himself to
become exclusively a protector of the child's "best interests" so that
there is no one acting as a spokesperson for the child.

140. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-101(A)(1). Further,
Ethical Considerations 7-11 and 7-12 provide respectively that:
The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence,
experience, mental condition or age of a client, or the nature of a particular
proceeding. Examples include the representation of an illiterate or an incompetent, service as a public prosecutor or other government lawyer, and appearances
before administrative and legislative bodies.
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of
making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or
other legal representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those
decisions which are normally the prerogative of the client to make. If a client
under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in
Court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of his client. If the client is
capable of understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the
aduancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified
from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible aid.
If the disability of a client and the lack of legal representative compels a lawyer
to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances
then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his
client. But obviously, a lawyer cannot perform any act or make any decision
which the law requires his client to perform or make, either acting for himself if
competent, or by a duly constituted representative if legally incompetent.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, E.C. 7-11, 7-12 (emphasis added).
141. 469 Pa. 40, 364 A.2d 893 (1976).
142. Id. at 42, 364 A.2d at 894 (emphasis added).
143. Cf. Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 252, 258 n.1, 164 A.2d 113, 117 n.1
(1960). See also PA. R. Civ. P. 2015-2064.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 5

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
V.

[VOL. 23: p. 445

CONCLUSION

It appears to this author that children subject to reports of
suspected abuse under the Pennsylvania Child Protective Law are
entitled to be represented at the earliest feasible stage in the
proceeding by independent counsel and that the guardian ad litem
system established by the law is inadequate to satisfy this right. It is
recommended that allegedly abused children be provided with
counsel at least at the point the child protective service determines
that a report of suspected abuse is "indicated' ' 1 44 and further that the
system for providing counsel be closely monitored to ensure that
counsel be able to dedicate a minimum of fifteen to twenty hours of
time for an average case 145 and be given the ability to secure
adequate social and medical expertise through court ordered examinations.
Finally, counsel for abused children should be adequately
trained in the peculiarities and subtleties of child advocacy prior to
appointment in any case to ensure that they are prepared to assume
their proper role of advocate for and protector of their clients.
144. See text accompanying notes 90-104 supra.
145. See note 131 supra.
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